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BAILIFF: All rise. Oyez, oyez. All those who have business
before this, the Honorable Supreme Court of the United States, are
admonished to draw near and give their attention for the Court is now
sitting. God save the United States and this Honorable Court.
The Supreme Court of United States is now in session. Justices
Cohen, Fox, Raudabaugh, Silverman, Truesdale and Chief Justice Lewis
presiding.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: You may proceed.
MR. ELOVSON: May it please the Court, your Honors, my
name is John Elovson and I along with my co-counsel Christy Holman
represent the Petitioner Julie McCoy in this action. Before I begin, I'd
like to reserve two minutes of time for rebuttal. Your Honors, my
co-counsel Christy Holman will argue why the Petitioner has stated a
valid cause of action for disparate impact under the ADEA;' and I will
be arguing why the terms of Petitioner's collective bargaining agreement
requiring her to submit her ADEA claim to final and binding arbitration
is unenforceable as a matter of law. Your Honors, this case is about
autonomy and safeguarding individual statutory rights; and the Court of
Appeals for the 13th Circuit failed to achieve this result when it found
Petitioner's arbitration as her sole means of addressing her ADEA claim
in this case.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Let me ask you, didn't your client file
a grievance?
MR. ELOVSON: Yes, she did.

Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
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JUSTICE SILVERMAN: She opted to use the grievance
procedure to her advantage, did she not?
MR. ELOVSON: Yes, she did, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Why shouldn't we accept at least the
factual finding of the arbitrator that there was no discrimination?
Putting aside the legal issues, why shouldn't we accept the factual
finding? Is this like getting two bites at the apple?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, in a sense, yes. However, the
alternatives to not allowing Petitioner to have two bites at the apple are
much graver than allowing that to happen. By not allowing Petitioner
to have two bites at the apple essentially what this Court allows to
happen is for a collective entity to waive the individual rights of an
individual for the collective benefit of a majority of individuals and also
takes the risk of that right being lost entirely.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Why is it a waiver? If she opted to
file a grievance and go to arbitration and a finding was made on the facts
that there was no discrimination? Why is it a waiver? She opted to do
-it.
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, she did opt to do it. Under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, she did not agree initially
to waive that right. That right was waived before Petitioner even began
working for Puerta Pacific College. The Union pre-negotiated that right
with the employer and thereby prospectively waived that right.
JUSTICE COHEN: Counselor, would it have made any
difference if no grievance had been filed in this circumstance?
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MR. ELOVSON: In what sense, your Honor?
JUSTICE COHEN: Well, we know there was a grievance filed
and it went to arbitration. What is the legal significance of that? Would
the situation with which the Court is confronted be any different if this
individual had simply chosen not to file a grievance?
MR. ELOVSON: No, your Honor, for two reasons. First,
because a union may not, to begin with, prospectively waive the right of
a jury trial of the individual members of its union. And, secondly, as
recognized by this Court in the Alexander line of cases, the filing of a
grievance and pursuing that under a grievance procedure alone. is
insufficient to preclude a later suit in Federal Court. However, your
Honors, the real issue in this case is that the collective entity is waiving
the individual right for the collective benefit of the majority of members
and this Court has distinguished between the rights that a union may
waive and the rights that it may not.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: Counsel, the whole purpose of the
collective bargaining agreement; and, that is, in an employment setting
issues regarding work where you have a union and negotiate an
agreement, it's basically, as you're characterizing it, the tyranny of the,
majority but at the same time, the purpose of that relationship is
purposely to waive certain rights, to waive certain individual rights, for
the benefit of that relationship negotiated on behalf of all? So I'm at a
loss to understand what is your objection to this plaintiff appellant here
losing out in favor of the negotiated process for resolving
employment-related disputes, and clearly this is simply a matter of
employment policy coming up against a business decision at the campus.
It's sort of ordinary, isn't it?

2 Alexander v. Gardener-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
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MR. ELOVSON: No, your Honor, it is not. It is precisely what
this Court has distinguished in its cases such as in Barrentine v.
Arkansas-BestFreightSystem? And that is that there are certain rights
that a union may waive on behalf of its employees such as certain
seniority benefits or economic plans or even an individual or even rights
that are conferred by statute.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: But.Counsel, I'm sorry to interrupt
again, but in negotiating the agreement, if you're familiar with the
process of bargaining, that probably was a fairly significant chip on the
table that the parties adjusted overall economic tradeoffs for so that the
right to give up setting up the employer for being lambasted with
multiple counter-suits for other issues, they have a nice clean tray. They
probably paid more in wages or in benefits or what have you. Isn't that
part of the deal?
MR. ELOVSON: No, your Honor, it is not because the rights
that a union may waive have been collectively conferred on the
individual members in order to gain collective benefit at the negotiating
table. That's the rationale behind the right to strike and certain other
collective rights that this Court has recognized that unions may bargain
on'the behalf of their union members. However, that rationale does not
underlie Congress's purposes for passing individual right statutes to
begin with.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: An individual could waive the right
but a union could not on behalf of the individual?
MR. ELOVSON: Precisely, your Honor.

3 450 U.S. 728, 747 (1981).
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JUSTICE SILVERMAN: But doesn't that give a benefit to
people who join unions? It discriminates in favor of people who join
unions. They get two bites at the apple whereas those who don't join
unions don't.
MR. ELOVSON: No, your Honor. There is no benefit because
each person, whether they're a member of a union or not a member of a
union, will be able to pursue their claim in Federal Court and that's
precisely what Congress intended.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: But an individual could waive the
rights and, therefore, be required to go to arbitration.
MR. ELOVSON: They could, your Honors.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: But if you're in a union setting, you
cannot waive the right?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, as the 7th Circuit just decided
this Thursday in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Company4 there is an

arrangementthat will allow an individual under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to waive their rights to a jury trial. In that case;
your Honor, Chief Justice Posner recognized that a union may not
prospectively waive a union member's rights to a jury trial. However,
if that individual, while they're still a union member, may agree
individually with the employer to pursue arbitration, then that waiver is
acceptable. And the reason for that is because in that case it is the
individual himself as the individual in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane

Corp.5 that has made the decision to waive that right.

4 Nos. 96-2437, 96-2892, 1997 WL 125936 (7th Cir.1997).
5 500 U.S. 20(1991).

And the
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distinction, your Honors, is because it is an individual who is waiving
the individual right for an individual benefit and that is not what occurs
when a union may prospectively waive these rights.
JUSTICE COHEN: Counsel, let me ask you this. Suppose the
result of the arbitration had been different than it is here and that
discrimination would have been filed. Supposing I don't have to honor
that. I'm entitled to have my rights adjudicated in a jury trial proceeding
in Federal District Court. Would your arguments be the same here?
MR. ELOVSON: For the employer, no, use the individual rights
statutes that are found under Title VIP and the ADEA were written for
employees to protect their rights in the workplace. They were not
intended to protect the rights of employers in the workplace.
JUSTICE COHEN: But are you saying the employer doesn't
have any rights in this matter at all?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, the employer does have rights.
The employer has the right, as does the individual employee, to arbitrate
the claims as best they can at that proceeding. However, if that
proceeding does not end perhaps the way that they would like, they may
still appeal that decision. They may still appeal that decision.
JUSTICE COHEN:
appealing of an arbitration?

Do we know what rights there are on

MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, appeal is very limited. It's
limited to manifest disregard of the law and factual issues. The factual
determinations of an arbitrator are very deferential. But again, your

6

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
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Honor, the point of these statutes is to protect individual statutory rights
and thereby allowing an employee a second chance to vindicate their
claim in an appropriate forum is different than allowing an employer to
challenge again a determination of the arbitrator.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: But what is it you don't like about
some of my very fine colleagues on the 4th Circuit Bench?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, the 4th Circuit's decision in
Austin7 is incorrect for thievery reasons we just mentioned. The Austin
Court never went through an analysis between the difference of the
collective rights that a union may waive and the individual rights that it
may not.'
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: Didn't the employer pay in the
bargain for the contract and that the contract that they negotiated
specifically included the provisions for waiving statutory claims? Hasn't
the employer paid for the bargain?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, the issue here is not whether the
employer has paid for the bargain because even if they paid for the
bargain, that does not mean that a contract is unconscionable or violates
public policy.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: So you're saying a union then only
represents collective interests not individual interests?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, by definition a union should only
be able to represent the collective interests of the individual members of

' Austin v. Owens-BrockwayGlass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
8Id.
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the union and should not be able to prospectively waive the individual
statutory rights that have been conferred by independent power, i.e.,
Congress in this case, to mandate that there is a minimum level of
protection for workers in the workplace.
JUSTICE FOX: Counsel, why should we consider this kind of
waiver to be unconscionable? We have held in Gilmer that the
unrepresented employee can be compelled essentially as a condition of
employment to arbitrate these kinds of claims which is a much more
vulnerable position, being forced into an arbitration system than a
represented employee.9 Why should we be more concerned about the
represented employee and the protection of his rights than we are about
the unrepresented employee?
MR. ELOVSON:
Your Honor, perhaps I misspoke.
Unconscionable is not the proper term, rather against public policy is a
more appropriate term to use in this case. Your Honors, that is the
whole point, because there is an inherent conflict between the role of the
union as the exclusive representative of an individual in an arbitration
and someone trying to vindicate their individual statutory rights as
opposed to the individual in Gilmer."° Your Honors, the individual in
Gilmer was, although not represented by a Union, was free to choose his
own lawyer."I
JUSTICE FOX: Why is there more conflict in this situation than
any kind of unjust discharge claim? In either case the employee is
claiming that he was discharged in violation of some kind of constraint
on the employer. Why would the union's interest be any more different

9 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
10 Id. at 20.
1l Id. at 35.
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than the employee's in representing him on the statutory claim than on
any unjust discharge, unjust cause discharge claim?
MR. ELOVSON: Precisely for the reasons that this Court
enunciated in its Barrentine decision. Your Honors, the overall goal of
the union is to maximize the economic benefit of the maximum numbers
of its individuals; and what happens is any individual statutory rights
casesJUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: Well, now, Counselor, haven't we
already'spoken many years ago in a line of cases that puts the union in
the position of even being sued if it does not properly represent the
interests of each individual member?
MR. ELOVSON:
Your Honor, the union's duty of fair
representation is insufficient to safeguard individual statutory rights in
the arbitration process. Although this Court has recognized in decisions
such as Vaca v. Sipes 2 that a union may not act arbitrarily,
discriminatorily or in bad faith towards its members. It is equally
recognized that this is an extremely high threshold for a union member
to have to prove. For example, your Honors, in Air Line Pilots
Association Internationalv. O'Neill, 3 this Court recognized explicitly
that for an individual to be able to sue, to successfully sue, their union
for a breach of its duty of fair representation that employee must show
that the activities by the union were wholly irrational." Your Honors,
Congress did not pass the individual statutory rights at issue in this case
in order to be protected by a threshold of irrationality on the part of the
person who is supposed to be protecting their rights.

2 386 U.S. 171, 190(1967).

a 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991).
Id. at 78.

"4
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JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: Well, let me ask you from a public
policy point of view, should Congress continue over the years to
continually add more and more protective rights through individual
additional statutes, are we putting an impossible burden here on the
employer and on the union and really bringing about a reason to not be
interested in reaching negotiated agreements if you're setting yourself up
for constant multiple lawsuits?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, that is unfortunately the
give-and-take process of the collectiveJUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: Isn't it just a take process? Where
is the give?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, the give is that both individuals
during arbitration have the opportunity to expeditiously end the lawsuit
that they may have against the employer.
JUSTICE COHEN: Counselor, is the collective bargaining
relationship set up on a voluntary basis?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honors, to a certain degree it is
voluntary as in this case that Ms. McCoy chose to become a member of
the union. However, the actual collective bargaining process itself
which requires mandatory binding arbitration should not be considered
to be voluntary in the sense as enforceable. The reason for that again,
your Honors, is because the terms of the agreement that this individual
is agreeing toCHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Isn't the union's duty of fair
representation adequate to preserve the rights and protect the interests
of the individual members?
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MR. ELOVSON: No, again, your Honor, because the threshold
of showing that the union has breached its duty of fair representation is
an extremely high burden and that's precisely the point that this Court
made in McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan,5 that the Court
was unwilling to allow arbitration of a 1983 claim in that case which
precluded a later suit in Federal Court. 6 And one of the reasons for that
is simply because of the misalignment of interest between the union and
the individual claimant and also the difficulty that the fair duty of
representation presents in showing that it has been breached.
JUSTICE TRUESDALE: Counsel, is there any indication in this
record that the union did anything other than go one hundred percent to
bat for Ms. McCoy in representing her adequately?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, I see that my time is up. May I
respond?
JUSTICE TRUESDALE: Yes, please.
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honors, the record is insufficient to
indicate whether the union in this case actually sufficiently and
vigorously pursued her claim. However, this Court understands that its
decisions have much larger implications than just the facts before this
case. The issue before this case is whether this Court is going to allow
a situation where the collective entity that may have a direct conflict of
interest with the individual may continue to be the sole representative of
that person in arbitration.
JUSTICE FOX: Again, could you articulate what that conflict

15

466 U.S. 284, 286 (1984).
287,

16 Id. at
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of interest is?
MR. ELOVSON: Certainly, Justice Fox. The conflict of interest
is that the goal of the union is to maximize the overall benefit, economic
benefit, for the majority of its members, and suits brought under Title
VII and the ADEA threaten that because the individual is seeking
monetary damages under those claims.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH:
follow-up question.

But, Counsel, if I may ask a

CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Yes.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: It seems to me your argument is
saying something akin to the fact that to the extent that an individual is
singled out improperly under a particular statute that's designed to
protect people, minorities, people with different attributes from the
majority, you're saying that somehow that that would work against the
interests of the majority or that the majority would work against the
interests of the minority. That's what goes on in courts and in the public
sector all the time and in the battle in the courts. .Isn't the union made
better even if the decision goes in favor of the individual here than
againstthe collective interests of the majority?
MR. ELOVSON: Your Honor, no, it is not; and the reason for
that is because the union again seeks to maximize the economic benefits
of its members. That's the rationale of having a union to begin with, is
to be able to provide a united front to negotiate for better economic
terms for its members. And the sacrifice of the individual statutory
rights are not necessarily going to affect the union standing with a
majority of its members and that's where the inherent conflict lies.
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CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Let me ask you this final question:
Are you suggesting earlier in your comment that there's some
differentiation in remedies available, either by way of the collective
bargaining through arbitration or the statutory remedies?
MR. ELOVSON: No, your Honor, that was not the point I was
making. I was making that the remedies which individuals seek by
bringing a claim under the ADEA can threaten the economic certainty
of the majority of its members because if an individual seeks monetary
damages for an egregious violation of their civil rights, that award may
threaten the employer's ability to provide moneys for economic plans or
benefits to the majority of its workers. And that's precisely what this
Court recognized in Barrentinef' , your Honors. Unions do sacrifice the
individual claims of its members because they try to maximize the
benefit for the majority. Thank you.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Proceed.
MS. HOLMAN: May it please the Court, my name is Christy
Holman, counsel for Petitioner Julie McCoy. This case is about age
discrimination and about ensuring that the purpose of Congress in
enacting the ADEA is fulfilled. First, this Court should find that
disparate impact is actionable under the ADEA because to hold
otherwise would defeat the purpose of Congress. Second, this Court
should reverse the decision of the District Court because respondent has
not established a business necessity. Disparate impact should be
actionable under the ADEA. The same reasons that led this Court to
apply disparate impact liability under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power
Company 8 apply to the ADEA.

450 U.S. at 735.

8 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
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CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Is there anything in the statute of the
ADEA that suggests disparate impact is available as an analysis?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, Congress did not specifically
address disparate analysis or disparate impact liability or place it under
the statute but neither did Congress do so under Title VII. However, the
language of the ADEA and the language of Title VII are very similar.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Could the Congress have done so
under the 1991 Civil Rights Act19 and made it explicitly clear that it was
available?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, Congress could have done so.
However looking to the 1991 Civil Rights Act2" where Congress
expressly wrote disparate impact liability enters Title VII, Congress did
so in response to this Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing v.
d2' where this Court altered the burden of proof required
Antonio
in a Title
2
VII disparate impact liability case.23
JUSTICE COHEN: Counsel, are you saying the law was so
clear in 1991 that there was a right to bring a disparate impact claim
that there was no need for Congress to have so stated if that were its
intention?
MS. HOLMAN: With respect to the ADEA, your Honor?
JUSTICE COHEN: Yes.
"9 Pub.L.No.102-166.

Id.
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
23 Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659.
20
21
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MS. HOLMAN: Yes. And that is precisely my point and that
this Court has recognized in Lorillard v. Pons, 24 for example, that
Congress is deemed to be aware of the interpretation that courts give to
statutes.25 And in 1991 every Circuit Court to have considered the issue
found that disparate impact liability was available under the ADEA and
thus Congress, by not taking action during the ADEA, was deemed to be
aware that courts have found disparate impact liability to be available.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: What is the employment practice that
you feel falls more harshly on the protected class in this particular case?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, here Ms. McCoy challenges Part
II of the profit plan which is the salary structure which links years of
experience to salary.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: She was making more money and
why isn't that a valid defense? The fact that the school has to pay more
money, how does that adversely impact on age?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, here Ms. McCoy was terminated
because she had too many years of experience and earned too high a
salary and the statistics is that Ms. McCoyJUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: But, Counsel, you could look at it
a different way, particularly the 7th Circuit Chicago School would look
at it as though this school has made a conscious determination and that
is if you want well reasoned, wise teaching you go to a school that
employs older people and pays more. And this school has made a
decision they can't afford that and so students matriculating ought to
U.S. 575, 580 (1978).
Id. at 580.

24 434
25
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know that they'll get less wise, younger and more inexperienced
teaching. Isn't that pure and simple the bottom line choice here?
MS. HOLMAN: No, your Honor, it's not.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: How are you going to pay for
someone if you have a financial inability to pay?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, here the record reflects that
Puerta Pacific does not have a business necessity and cannot justify its
salary structure on the basis that it cannot afford the salaries. There is
no business necessity in this case; and looking to the stipulated facts,
Petitioner does note that Respondent experienced a business downturn
in 1989 and layoffs in 1991. However, since then, the District Court
found that the school is able to attract new faculty, is reopening degree
programs.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: But isn't it also possible that the
school made a conscious decision and said, "Quite frankly Ms. McCoy
has not been teaching all these years. It's been an experiential-based
benefit that she brings to the classroom and quite frankly the faculty has
elected in this course to say that just a few years in the field is adequate
to basically learn, you know, 90 percent of what one would teach and we
don't need an additional 30 years of experience." Isn't that possible and
what's discriminatory about that decision?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, the problem here with Puerta
Pacific's salary structure is that by its terms it excludes over 80 percent
of qualified individuals over the age of 40 in the State of Wagner and for
that reason it has a discriminatory effect.
JUSTICE FOX: Counsel,just to return to that point on disparate

1034
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impact analysis, didn't this Court essentially decide that issue in Hazen
Paper6 when we said that as long as the employer's decision is wholly
made and motivated by factors other than age, that the concerns that
ADEA were designed to address are not present and that's true even if
the motivating factor happens to be correlated with age?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, Hazen PaperCompany v. Biggins
is distinguishable from this case for two very important reasons. First,
this Court in that case expressly reserved the issue of disparate impact
liability; but more importantly, Hazen Paper was a disparate treatment
case. 27 And Respondent will make much of the fact that this Court
stated in Hazen Paperthat age and factors that correlate with age are
analytically distinct and disparate impact liability should therefore not
be available 8 But all this Court held in Hazen PaperCompany was that
a disparate treatment plaintiff must establish discriminatory intent and
that merely showing that defendant-employer based its decision on
factors that correlate with age is insufficient to establish discriminatory
intent.29
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Counselor, why should this Court
impose a theory of liability based exclusively on the language of the
statute?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, the language of the statute here
mirrors that of Title VII and this Court implied disparate impact liability
under Title VII and it should similarly do so under the ADEA. First,
there's nothing in the language to preclude disparate impact liability.

26
27
28
29

Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Additionally, if we look to specific provisions, again Respondent will
argue that the key difference is the exception to liability under the
ADEA for reasonable factors other than age, a provision not found under
Title VII; but the critical point here is that that is an exception to
liability. And Congress intended for a plaintiff to able to bring a
disparate impact claim and for an employer to then be able to defend the
claim on the ground that its decision was based on a reasonable factor
other than age that rises to the level of a business necessity and this is a
question for the finder of fact.
JUSTICE COHEN: Counselor, would you say that our hands are
actually tied on this disparate impact analysis, that the answer is actually
crystal clear already that there must a disparate impact claim?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, disparate impact analysis must be
allowed under the ADEA, yes, Petitioner wholeheartedly agrees with
that for the additional reasonJUSTICE COHEN: But what I'm asking is whether it's crystal
clear already that your position mandates that result?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, Petitioner cannot necessarily say
that it's crystal clear because there is a split in the circuits.
JUSTICE COHEN: Okay. Then let me ask you this: Since the
Court has had the benefit of the last 30 years of dealing with disparate
impact cases, why should this Court if it has the choice to extend the
situation and end up with more and more lawsuits based not on actual
treatment but based on statistics?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, one particularly compelling
reason is an additional similarity between the ADEA and Title VII and

1036
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that is the problem of sophisticated employers who can institute policies
that are apparently facially neutral but have the effect of discriminating.
And this Court in Watson v. Forth Worth Bank & Trust"0 stated that
disparate treatment alone could not eliminate current practices where
discriminatory intent is virtually impossible to prove.3
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Ms. Holman, do you concede that this
is facially neutral? My understanding of the facts is Ms. Stubing who
was hired at $27,000 a year, Ms. McCoy was never offered that job at
$27,000 a year. So the discriminatory practice that was engaged in was
the failure to offer her the job first. Isn't that the discriminatory practice,
failure to offer Ms. McCoy the job at $27,000 before they offered to it
someone younger?
MS. HOLMAN: No, your Honor. Here the discriminatory
practice is the fact that the salary structure by its terms excludes almost
90 percent of qualified individuals.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: But supposing Ms. McCoy was
willing to accept the job at $27,000?
MS. HOLMAN: Absolutely, if Puerta Pacific had a salary
structure in place and would enable any individual, any qualified
individual, to accept the job for the first year at $28,000 or less than
salary, that would not have a disparate impact. And particularly since
if we look to the salary structure, it only limits salary for the first year of
employment. Ms. McCoy was not given that employment.
JUSTICE TRUESDALE: Does the record show whether she
30

487 U.S. 977, 988-89 (1988).

"' Id. at 988.
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offered to work at that lowered rate, if Francis Parker, I believe the
plaintiff in that case, had offered to work at the lower rate?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, the record does not reflect
whether Ms. McCoy made the offer or was given the option. However,
looking to whether Respondent has established a business necessity in
this case, here Respondent has not; and while this Court has never
articulated the standard for business necessity under the ADEA, Ms.
McCoy urges this Court to adopt the formulation of the 8th Circuit to
establish business necessity the practice must be job related and that
there must be a compelling need to maintain the practice. And here
Respondent fails to meet this standard.
JUSTICE TRUESDALE: Wouldn't that get the Court into the
business of substituting its business judgment for that of the plaintiff in
this case?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, while Petitioner does note that
there's a judicial policy against second-guessing business decisions,
Circuit Courts have already accepted disparate impact liability and the
majority of them recognize and do conduct the necessary analysis of
whether the business is able to articulate necessity it is compelling and
the practice is job related. Courts are already conducting the analysis.
JUSTICE COHEN: When you say courts, you really mean
juries, do you not?
MS. HOLMAN: Yes, your Honor. Most typically it would be
a jury althoughin this case there was a bench trial. An additional reason
Puerta Pacific has not established business necessity in this case is
because any businessnecessity that might have existed is certainly in the
past as demonstrated by the record. But, your Honors, even if this Court
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finds that somehow Respondent has managed to justify its
discriminatory hiring practices as a business necessity, Ms. McCoy asks
this Court to remand to the District Court because here the District
CourtCHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Isn't there a finding in the record that
the employer had made its business necessity defense?
MS. HOLMAN: Yes, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Are you asking us to substitute our
finding as a matter of law to the Court's finding which is a fact finding?
MS. HOLMAN: Your Honor, the District Court's finding is
based on fact but whether business necessity was established should be
reviewable by this Court as a mixed question of fact and law; and in this
case Puerta Pacific has not made that showing. If we look to the
findings of the District Court in particular the record reflects that while
Petitioner only challenges Part II of the profit plan which is the salary
structure and not Part I which is the endowment fund, the District
Court's findings do not distinguish between Part I and Part II and thus
offer the benefits that the District Court found as a result of this overall
profit plan. For all we know, they could be solely as a result ofthe Part
I and thus the District Court has not made particularized findings of fact
that Part II of the profit plan is essential in this case and meets the
business necessity. But, your Honors, if this Court does find somehow
that Respondent has established business necessity, Ms. McCoy does ask
that this Court remand so that she may be given an opportunity to
establish that there's an alternative practice that would meet the business
goals without the disparate impact. In conclusion, your Honor, disparate
impact must be actionable. I see my time is up. May I conclude my
statement?
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CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Yes, you can.
MS. HOLMAN: Disparate impact must be found actionable
under the ADEA or the purpose of this statute will be defeated.
Congress did not intend to create a right without a remedy. Thank you.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Counsel.
MR. GOODSTADT: Good morning, Mr. Chief Justice and may
it please the Court, my name is Andrew Goodstadt, counsel for the
Respondent Puerta Pacific College. I will be addressing why the
arbitration provision contained in the collective bargaining agreement
between Puerta Pacific College and the American union of College
Professors should be enforced. My co-counsel Lisa Solbakken will be
discussing why the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not
recognize the disparate impact theory of discrimination liability. Your
Honors, the arbitration provision contained in the collective bargaining
agreement between Puerta Pacific College and the American Union of
College Professors should be enforced and thus the arbitration decision
upheld for three reasons.
JUSTICE COHEN: Counselor, I want explore with you
something I did with your opposing counsel; that is, we know factually
here that the grievance happened to have been filed and the case taken
to arbitration. First, let me just suppose that a grievance hadn't been
filed at all. What effect, if any, would that have on your argument here
today?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honors, had the grievance not been
filed based upon the union's decision to not file a grievance, then
Petitioner would have a claim agitinst the union for a breach of duty of
fair representation and upon that claim the union would have to show
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that they made an independent and objective investigation into theJUSTICE COHEN: I'm asking something a little different. As
I understand the collective bargaining agreement, the individual can file
a grievance and it's up to the union to decide whether or not to process
that to arbitration; is that correct?
MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE COHEN: Therefore, my question is as follows:
Suppose the individual said, "I'd rather have a jury trial" and this is right
off the bat. "So I'm going to ignore the grievance procedure in the
collective bargaining agreement and go straight to court." What effect,
if any, would that have on your analysis?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the outcome in that situation
would be the exact same. In that situation we would put this case in
2 where
purview of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson"
this Court held that

where a valid arbitration agreement exists between the employer and the
employee that the Court will preclude the plaintiff from bringing their
claim in Federal District Court and in fact must follow the terms and
conditions of the agreement and file their claim in arbitration."a
JUSTICE COHEN: Now, let's suppose the grievance was filed
but the union says in its judgment, "We're not taking this case to
arbitration." So there never was an arbitration and then we have the
District Court suit that was brought here. Would that change your
analysis in any way?

32 500 U.S. at 35.
33 Id.
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MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor-no, your Honor. The
outcome would be the same. As stated before, the grievant's claim in
that situation would be one of a breach of duty of fair representation
against the union.
JUSTICE COHEN: So you're saying in circumstanceswhere the
union doesn't breach its duty that this individual doesn't even get one
bite at the apple? That the mere filing of the grievance is the sole right
that this individual has rather than the two bites that are asserted here?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, Ms. McCoy when she
entered her employment at the college, she made a valid, knowing and
voluntary decision to join the union. By doing so, she empowered the
union to negotiate the terms and conditionsJUSTICE FOX: Counselor, there's no requirement here that this
arbitration provision only applies to people that are actually members of
the union. I take it that any person that is in the bargaining unit, whether
a member of the union or not, is covered by this arbitration clause; is
that correct?
MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE FOX: So in that sense the only knowing decision she
made was to accept employment there; is that correct?
Your Honor, although accepting
MR. GOODSTADT:
employment was one of the known decisions in this case, by
empowering the union to be her exclusive representative, she then
empowered them to represent her in these proceedings. However, if she
did not choose to join the union, then she would not have empowered the
union to be her sole representative. She could have empowered her own
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attorney to represent her at the proceedings; and, therefore, again that
would put her in the exact same position that the plaintiff in Gilmer was
in. In fact, in this situation, your Honor, the employee governed by the
collective bargaining agreement, as Justice Silverman pointed out
before, in fact benefits the position.
JUSTICE FOX: To be clear here, your argument is dependent
on the notion that not only did she make a voluntary decision to accept
employment here, but she made an additional crucial decision to
designate the union as her exclusive representative. I'm not sure that's
established in the record.
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the record doesn't reflect that
the university is a closed shop. And under the collective bargaining
agreement it's not a closed shop. The employee does have the
opportunity to choose whether to empower the union.
JUSTICE TRUESDALE: Following up on Justice Fox's
comment, the law is clear that the union is obligated to represent
non-members as well as members. So that in filing a grievance, and I
think Justice Cohen brought out, that if the union on investigation into
the exercise of its best judgment decided that there was not merit to a
grievance and then it would decline a particular arbitration, then where
would that leave the situation?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, that situation would put the
individual in this case in the same position as the plaintiff was in
Clayton v. UA W,34 where in that case the union decided not to bring the
claim. There was a contract in that case. The union decided not to bring
the contractual claim to arbitration. This Court stated in that opinion
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that in that case the employee has the opportunity to file a case in
Federal District Court against the union for a breach of fair duty of
representation. Upon that breach, that is, when Ms. McCoy in this case,
upon demonstrating this breach, that is where Ms. McCoy in this case
will have her bite at the apple.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Mr. Goodstadt, if we are to conclude
that disparate impact does apply in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, would we still defer to an arbitrator who concluded it
did not apply?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, when the arbitrator made his
decision that disparate impact did not apply, this Court had not yet
determined that issue.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: If we were to determine it does apply,
would we defer to an arbitrator who is incorrect in his interpretation of
the law?
MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor, becauseJUSTICE SILVERMAN: So then the union has waived
substantive rights to the Age Discrimination Act?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor. In fact this Court stated
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson a5 by agreeing to arbitrate an Age
Discrimination in Employment Act36 claim that in fact the plaintiff
doesn't forego any substantive provisions.

36

500 U.S. at 26.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.

1044

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XIII

JUSTICE SILVERMAN: But if the arbitrator concluded that
disparate impact does not apply, incorrectly in our view, why isn't the
employee worse off than before the arbitration under the substantive law
that applies?
MR. GOODSTADT: Because in that situation, your Honor, the
employee, Ms. McCoy in this case, would be in the same position as the
employees who brought their cases under the Disparate Act theory of the
ADEA since 1991, where before 1991 the circuit courts did not
recognize that theory of disparate impact liability. In those situations,
this Court's determination is not retroactively applied in those cases.
3 7 that in
This Court stated that in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
fact

arbitration should be placed on the same footing as the Court system.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: It's not retroactively applied to the
case that's before us at bar. If we conclude that disparate impact should
apply, she is in effect worse off under the law because she went to the
arbitration because the union has given up substantive rights. Could the
union waive her right to grieve for age discrimination completely?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: So did it waive the right of the subject
to disparate impact for age discrimination?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: That's what happened here.
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, what the union did was waive
31 500 U.S.

at 29-30.
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a right to bring this claim in federal district court. There are a number
of federal district courts that have not recognized this theory of liability
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: If we say they're wrong, then she has
waived the substantive right?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, if this Court were to
determine today that in fact they do not recognize the theory of liability,
then she would have foregone the substantive provision in the Act, just
as every claimant has foregone substantive provisions iP the district
courts.

JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Should we defer to that?
MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor, because that would place
arbitration on the same footing as the federal district court because the
purpose behind the Federal Arbitration Act3 and this Court has stated on
numerous occasions since 1983 that arbitration should in fact be
deferred to as a federal district court be deferred to.
JUSTICE FOX: You would apply a lower standard of review to,
say, a Court of Appeals review of an arbitration decision that was
appealed to the Court than to the claim that had been brought in district
court? Is there a different standard that would be applied if someone
was challenging the arbitration finding?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the Federal Arbitration Act,
Section 10, specifically provides for procedure on appellate matters to
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take in this situation? 9 In fact, it is very similar to the standard, clearly
erroneous, where the arbitration decision must be upheld unless the
arbitrator capriciously or arbitrarily applied the law.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: You're not suggesting under the FAA
that Congress intended to put arbitration and the federal district court on
the same footing?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor. The FAA was originally
enacted in response to a growing case backlog in the federal court
system. This Court has interpreted that statute and has used that statute
in fact to put them on the same footing since 1983 and that's Old Sage
Home Hospitalv. American ConstructionCorporation.That's one of the
4" does not apply in
primary reasons why Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
this case. Alexander v. Gardner-Denverwas decided in 1974 at a time
where in fact there was a judicial facility towards the arbitrator's
confidence and ability to vindicate a plaintiff's statutory rights under the
ADEA, Title VII, and the ADEA.
JUSTICE COHEN: Counselor, you tell us that the union has the
power to make the waiver that it made in this case; is that right?
MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE COHEN: But in response to Justice Silverman you
said that they don't have the power to take away the rights under the
ADEA itself; is that also correct?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the union doesn't have the
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right to take away the substantive rights of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
JUSTICE COHEN: Where is the right line? How are we as a
to
court divine that the union has the power to take away Right A but not
Right B? Are we supposed to just feel what the right decision is?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor. The union has a right to
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment regardless of the
bargaining agreement. This is a preferred method of labor negotiations.
JUSTICE COHEN: Let's suppose a bargain is struck and the
employer says to the union, "I'm willing to pay everybody here two
dollars an hour extra if I don't have to be bound by the ADEA. So,
union, I'm proposing to you two bucks an hour extra for everybody but
I Want a written waiver from everybody that the ADEA won't apply."
And then that goes to a ratification and the employees say, "two bucks
an hour. I'll take my chances." What's this Court to do with that
situation?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, in that situation the union
and the employer in that situation have violated public policy. It's a
gross violation of public policy. They're taking away the statutory
substantive provisions afforded to an individual under the ADEA.
JUSTICE FOX: Are you saying that when Congress enacted the
ADEA that it considered certain aspects of the ADEA to be more
important than things like what forum these cases can be brought in?

have

MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, although Congress may not
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Interstate/Johnsod'does state that the forum in which this claim of age
discrimination can be decided is not foregoing any substantive
provisions of the statute. And, in fact, the plaintiffJUSTICE FOX: Our decision in that case was based on the fact
that the individuals who asserted the claim had them themselves made
a waiver. This is obviously a different situation where we're talking
about the union having waived the right for the employee and you have
acknowledged that certain aspects of the ADEA or rights under the
ADEA that the union could not waive. What is the distinction between
the rights that the union cannot waive and the right to go into Federal
Court? Why is it that they can waive that right and not other aspects of
the ADEA?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the union cannot waive as
articulated the substantive provisions the right to be free from
discrimination in the workplace. However, this Court stated that the
employee has not given up that right by bringing their claim in an
arbitral forum. It simply forgoes the federal district court forum in favor
of the arbitration forum.
JUSTICE FOX: Congress said to that employee that employee
has the right to bring that claim in federal court.
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, although Congress afforded
that right, Congress never stated that is its exclusive forum for the right
to be vindicated and this Court stated that in fact an arbitration forum is
a preferred method of vindicating an Age Discrimination Act claim.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Except on employment contracts, isn't
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this school interstate commerce?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor I believe you're referring to
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Yes.
MR. GOODSTADT: The interpretation of this act, this
provision, started in 1953 in the 3rd Circuit, Tenney Engineering,Inc.
v. United Radio and Machine Workers.42
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Do we have an employment contract
here?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, although a collective
bargaining agreement is not technically an employment contract
between an employer and employee, it does serve to govern the terms
and conditions of employment.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Well, she's bound by it?
MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: This school is engaged in interstate
commerce?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the school is not engaged
directly in interstate commerce as Section 1 would delineate.43 Section
1 is a narrow scope of interstate commerce. Congress deliberately chose

207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
43 9 U.S.C. § 1.
42
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to use narrow language in Section 1 and they chose Section 2JUSTICE SILVERMAN: That definition would be different
than under the National Labor Relations Act44 and employment law as
interpreted.
MR. GOODSTADT: I see my time is expired. May I continue?
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Please if you wouldn't mind. Under
every employment law that I know of interstate commerce is broadly
defined so far as federal jurisdiction is concerned and you're asking us
to adopt a narrow interpretation of the FAA. Why is that?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the language used in Section
2 does use broad language involving commerce which every Federal
Circuit Court uses to address this issue and this Court has held on a
number of times that language is coterminous with the broad powers
under the commerce laws that Congress has to regulate interstate
commerce. However, Section I specifically states "engaged in interstate
commerce" which is narrow language.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Isn't it a rule of statutory construction
when there are specifics and followed by general that the general is
limited by the specifics?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the rule of use in general in
statutory construction could state that.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS:
Congress on that?
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MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor. That is exactly my point.
In fact the last clause of Section 1 is in fact limited to sea persons,
railway workers and other groups that have engaged in commerce where
they're actually involved in delivering goods across state line.
JUSTICE FOX: Congress used those terms in the Fair Labor
Standards Act as well and courts have not interpreted them to mean
employees who were literally engaged in the transportation industry.
Why did Congress mean-that was my colleague's question as
well-why should we interpret the FAA but not the Fair Labor
45
Standards Act to cover only such employees?
MR. GOODSTADT: Because if Congress intended for Section
1 to be coterminous with Section 2, it would use that exact same
language. It deliberately chose the language and the history behind the
act reflects that in fact this exclusionary clause was enacted into the
statute in response to the seaman's union and railway workers and the
fact that they imposed it because Congress had already delineated
alternative dispute resolution for these industries.
JUSTICE FOX: What are the classes of workers other than
seamen or railway workers you think Congress had in mind under your
view of the phrase "any other classes of workers engaged in interstate
commerce?"
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, the 6th Circuit determined
that the U.S. Postal Service is an example of another industry that's
engaged in interstate commerce. As a history the Postal Service is
charged withactually delivering goods across state lines.

45
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JUSTICE FOX: I believe at the time that the FAA was enacted,
the U.S. Postal Service was a government agency, and its employees
were not private sector employees.
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, this is just an example of a
20th Century industry that fits within the delineated language of Section
I as another example of an industry that's engaged in interstate
commerce.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: What about Jones & Laughlin Steel
Company producing steel, wouldn't that be an interstate commerce
within the FAA?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN:
Were we wrong in Jones &
Laughlin?46 Was the National Labor Relations Act unconstitutional?
MR. GOODSTADT: No, your Honor; but in the 3rd Circuit case
in Tenney Engineering47 where the Circuit Court first interpreted the
language of the statute, that contract was a collective bargaining
agreement that governed employees who were engaged in
manufacturing goods that were to be delivered across state lines. And
this Court affirmatively relied on that decision, and that's actually a
similar case that describes and interprets the language of Section 1.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH:
Can you conceive of any
statutorily protected individual right that should not be deferred to
arbitration?

46
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MR. GOODSTADT: Yes, your Honor. In fact the Fair Labor
Standards Act has been determined to be a statute that is in fact not
amenable to arbitration. This Court set up a bright line test in Mitsubishi
Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth48 in determining
whether to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. First, the Court must look
to whether in fact the parties agree to arbitrate the dispute in question.
Whereas the instant case clearly Article 47 of the arbitration agreement.
And second where the statute in question is amenable to the arbitrable
process, the burden was placed on the plaintiff to show that something
in the legislative history, the legislative language would be contrary to
arbitration. The issue of whether the ADEA is in fact amenable to
arbitration was addressed by this Court in Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnsor9
in 1991 and was in fact held to be a statute that is amenable to
arbitration where a plaintiff can bring their claims in an arbitral forum
and have their rights fully vindicated.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: And as a good public policy to
send to arbitration claims of discrimination and preclude a claim for not
getting time-and-a-half for overtime?
MR. GOODSTADT: Your Honor, this Court has determined
that's vindication. Thank you.
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Good morning, your Honors. May it
please the Court, my name is Lisa Solbakken. I'm counsel for the
Respondent Puerta Pacific College. The District Court of Wagner erred
in determining disparate impact liability is an available form of recovery
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, which I'll refer to as
the ADEA, for three reasons. The first reason is the legislative history

48

473 U.S. 614, 619 (1985).

49 500 U.S. at
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which underlies the ADEA indicates that Congress never intended that
theory of recovery to be available under the act. The second reason is
that the unique statutory provisions of the ADEA indicate that disparate
impact liability would be in conflict to a full reading of the statutory
provisions. Third, the nature of the conduct prohibited by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act indicates that disparate impact
liability would be contrary to the purpose of that act. In the alternative
if this Court is to determine that disparate impact liability is available
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Respondent contends
that its profit plan falls within the business necessity exception to that
statute.
Your Honors, disparate impact liability is an extraordinary
protection which was judicially created by this Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company.5" In Griggs this Court looked to the purpose behind
Title VII and decided that in order to promulgate that purpose, eradicate
discrimination in employment, with regard to protective classes in Title
VII, disparate impact liability is necessary."'
JUSTICE COHEN: Isn't the very same true with respect to age
discrimination?
Why should we have one standard for racial
discrimination and another standard for age discrimination? Isn't that
just giving lawyers something to be arguing about?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: To the contrary, your Honor. The history
behind racial and sexual discrimination, two of the protected classes
under Title VII, that being invidious and malevolent discrimination, is
quite distinct from the discriminationJUSTICE FOX: You're saying that age discrimination can't be
50 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5' Id.
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malevolent or insidious?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, as per the Secretary's
report which provides a substantive basis for the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the purpose behind the Age Discrimination in
EmploymentAct was to prevent erroneous stereotypes as to the abilities
of the older workers. In fact the Secretary's report does explicitly
distinguish the historical discrimination peculiar to the protective class
of Title VII and that of the protective class of the Age Discrimination in
EmploymentAct. In order to eradicate these neutral policies which act
as a pretext to freeze the status quo of prior discriminatory practices, it
was necessary to create disparate impact liability under Title VII.
However, there's no need and no such need to a certain extent this form
of recovery to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Supposing you have a rule that said
seniority will be a factor in determining whether people will be let go.
In other words, an employer says ten years and you're out. It's a neutral
policy. It applies to everybody. Ten years seniority and you're out.
Obviously it affects older workers. Why wouldn't that be bad?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, there are specific
provisions in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act which protect
against exactly what you're speaking of, which protect against retirement
plans, which tend to discriminate against the protected class. So in that
instance the older workers would remain protected.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: I'm not talking about retirement But
in a case like this where a woman has worked for a certain number of
years and they let her go because she had a certain number of years.
Why isn't that something we should be concerned about? There's no
valid interest necessarily to the employer, is there, in having someone
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younger? There's no bona fide occupational reason why they should
have younger workers.
MS. SOLBAKKEN: No, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: If you have no valid interest, why
should we rule that it be legal?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, in the instant case
Puerta Pacific College has a valid reason for institutinga profit plan, that
reason being that this institution was one that was teetering on the edge
of financial ruin.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: But you didn't offer the job to Ms.
McCoy at this $27,000 rate?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: No, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Had you done that, that would have
freed you up from this discrimination charge?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: In this instance, yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: So why shouldn't we rule that the
employment practice in failing to offer her the job at $27,000 is
inherently discriminatory?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, in the first place, your Honor,
because disparate impact liability is not an available form of recovery
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In the second
instance, even if this Court has decided that it's an available form of
recovery, the profit plan is a business necessity exception which,
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although a business exception would concede a disparate impact in this
instance, it would preclude recovery because it is necessary in order to
maintain the operational viability of Puerta Pacific College.
JUSTICE FOX: Isn't Petitioner's argument that you need
disparate impact here to get the case into court, that the arguments you're
making that your client has an RFOA defense or business justification
defense are just that, defenses, and that without a disparate impact
analysis this claim could never get that far?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Exactly, your Honor, and Petitioner'sclaim
should not get that far because disparate impact liability should not be
recognized under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Am I
answering your question?
JUSTICE FOX: Under the circumstancesthat he says, that you
have some rule which is in fact for the purposes of age discrimination
which is facial and neutral, that you must after ten years leave the
company. Under your-if you don't have a disparate impact analysis,
you would never get to the point where you could determine whether the
employer had in fact a legitimate business because there's no
disparate-you can't show disparate treatment and the case is out of
court even in circumstanceswhere we're hypothesizingthat this is in fact
for purpose of age discrimination.
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, the Secretary's report in
creating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act exclusively stated
that this was not what age discrimination or the problem with age
discrimination was in this country. In fact it was the erroneous
stereotypes that were due to an older worker's ability to work and that
those factors which merely tend to bear more strongly upon the
protected class be dealt with in other factors.
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CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: In order to make out a case for
disparate impact don't have you to demonstrate that there's a rule
seemingly neutral on its face that has a disparate impact on a particular
class?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: And also isn't in most instances
experience correlated with age?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: In other words, the more experience
you have, the greater likelihood that you're going to be an older worker?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Isn't this exactly what this particular
Respondent did?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, yes, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Then why shouldn't disparate impact
apply?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, this Court has held or
this Court has determined that one's years of service is adequately
distinct from one's age and in that regard a factor may correlate with an
individual's age, yet exceed the boundaries of that which is sought to be
protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In fact in
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Hazen Company v. Biggins52 this Court stated that disparate treatment
was the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: I want to go back to this because
I think deferring to the Secretary's report and so forth is interesting but
somehow the logic of it is passing me by. Fellowjustices here made the
observation that it's a mathematical fact that if you have ten years of
experience over someone with one year, the odds are that you are
probably older. Certainly if you had 50 years of experience over
someone who had only ten years, odds are probably much more certain
that you're older. You keep referring to the notion that they're only
interested in disparate treatment analysis because of the stereotyping.
What is not stereotypical of having a policy screening out older people?
Doesn't that reflect underneath the same stereotypical view that an
individual case is advancing? What's the difference?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, in the instance of a
policy acting mechanicallyto disregard the abilities of older workers, a
disparate treatment claim would remain available because it is the
intention behind the employer's policy and in that regard the claimant
would beJUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: But that's not the question I'm
asking. All of these other statutes that you talked about have disparate
treatment options. What I'm trying to understand is why is it that you
are so intent on precluding us from going forward with the disparate
impact option?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: For a number of reasons, your Honor.
52 Hazen Paper,507 U.S. at 608.
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Congress has most recently indicated its intent not to permit disparate
impact liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in its
1991 Civil Rights amendments.5 3 In the Civil Rights Amendments in
1991 Congress explicitly provided for disparate treatment under Title
VII, yet failed to make an analogous amendment under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
JUSTICE COHEN: But Ms. Holman told us that in 1991 the law
was clear, even though the Supreme Court hadn't determined it, that
there was a right to bring a disparate act claim under ADEA. Was she
incorrect?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor. Moreover in 1991JUSTICE COHEN: Before we get to the moreover, how was she
incorrect?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, there was a circuit split
as to whether or not disparate impact liability was available under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act as indicated by the record in
this case. Moreover, your Honor, while Petitioner suggests that
disparate impact was added to Title VII merely in response to this
Court's decision in Wards Cove v. Antonio,54 Congress obviously had an
intent about the availability of disparate impact under Title VII.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Counselor, I'm confused. I'm trying
to get clear in my mind what's to prohibit an employer from identifying
a group of workers in the workplace, say, fifty-eight and older or fiftyseven and older and simply deciding, "I think I'm going to let these

53Pub.L.No. 102-166.
54 490 U.S. 642, 659
(1989).
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workers go and at some point in the future I'll replace them with younger
ones"? If disparate impact analysis is not available, what is to prevent
an employer from doing this, as a money saving device, as esthetic
appeal? What's to prevent him from doing this?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: A disparate treatment claim, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: You're saying that there's a lot of
individual disparate treatment claims? Suppose they lay off 150 workers
or 300 workers?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, in that instance as
articulated there would be an intentional thing on behalf of the employer
to discriminate against the older workers in that instance.
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Let me follow up Justice Lewis's
question. Suppose an employer said, "We don't want anyone with gray
hair waiting the tables." What public policy or reason do we have for
making that rule lawful?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: I'm sorry?
JUSTICE SILVERMAN: Why should that be lawful? What is
the employer's interest in saying, "We only want people with black hair
or brown hair serving tables and no gray haired individuals"? Wouldn't
that have a disparate impact on older people?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, if I'm understanding
your question, that would be arbitrary age discrimination and in that
regard the individuals would again have a disparate treatment claim as
would the secretary's report-
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JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: There's been a lot of Secretary
reports in the last few years that aren't always credited. So let's get back
to this question that they're pursuing. Tell me how you're going to
pursue the disparate treatment claim on behalf of the fifty or 100 or
whatever number of gray-haired waiters. What's the evidence of the
disparate treatment claim as to me or to Mr. Truesdale or any of the rest
of us up here with gray hair? How do you go after an individual case of
disparate treatment discrimination in that scenario?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, statistics would be one
element that a Court would look at when deciding a disparate treatment
claim. However, the statistics are the only means and it's the sole
evidence in a disparate impact claim. And in the instance of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act the probative value of these statistics
are blighted. In that regard their age does at one point haveJUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: So statistics can be used to make
out a disparate treatment claim alone, that of the 40,000 people a certain
telephone company claims to have laid off or separated, ninety percent
of people fifty and older got the axe. That makes out a disparate
treatment claim for anyone in that group?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: No, your Honor. I'm sorry if I misspoke
earlier. Statistics are the sole evidentiary tool under disparate impact
while under disparate treatment it would be one factor that a lower Court
could look at.
JUSTICE RAUDABAUGH: My question is: If we're only
going to limit people to a disparate treatment avenue and all they have
is evidence that they, plus anyone else who is fifty or older, got the axe
how much further do they have to go? Are they going to be successful
at all? They have no particular evidence of anything directed to them.

19971

WAGNER ORAL ARGUMENTS

1063

MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, to bring it back to the
facts of the instant case, Ms. McCoy would have a valid breach of
contract claim in that regard that she may pursue that claim pursuant to
the collective bargaining agreement. However, bringing a disparate
impact claim would not be the necessary way by which to vindicate her
rights.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: I'm confused. What I'm trying to
figure out is that under disparate impact you're saying that the statistics
is the sole evidence that the Court makes its judgment as to whether
discrimination occurred.
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Then how do you distinguish remedy
available in disparate impact between remedy available disparate
treatment when statistics are used in both instances?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Well, your Honor, I'm not sure I
understand what your Honor means. However, under Title VII both
aspects of recovery are available. Your Honor, I see that my time is
expired. May I answer your question?
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: You may answer this question.
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Under Title VII both aspects of recovery,
both theories of recovery are available. In that regard the remedies and
the damages available to a claimant would remain the same. However,
under disparate impact-underthe Age Discrimination in Employment
Act rather, excuse me, your Honor, such liability should remain
unavailable as per Congressional intent.
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JUSTICE TRUESDALE: Counsel, you mkde several references
to the Secretary's report.
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE TRUESDALE: I didn't hear you say about the fact
that EEOC55 which presumably has great expertise in this field, the
EEOC has filed that disparate impact is available under the ADEA 6
Why shouldn't the Court give great deference to the agency that is
charged with responsibility in this area?
MS. SOLBAKKEN: Yes, your Honor. Well, EEOC guidelines
are traditionally given deference by the Court except when they are
contrary to the plain reading of the statute as it is in the instant case.
Moreover, your Honors, this Court has invalidated the EEOC's
interpretation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act before.
And public employees of Ohio v. Beck,57 this Court stated that EEOC
erroneously brought in broader protection under Section 4(f) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act than actually was intended by
Congress and in that regard struck the guidelines as invalid5" which is
what should be done in the instant case, your Honor. Thank you.
MS. HOLMAN: Your HonorsJUSTICE COHEN: Ms. Holman, let me just ask you right off,
it seems we have a conflict between the two sides here. In 1991 what
was the state of the law with respect to disparate impact under ADEA?

5 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
56 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34.
57 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
38 Id.
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Was there a conflict in the circuits or was there not?
MS. HOLMAN: Thank you, your Honor. That was to be my
first point. In 1991 there was no circuit split and opposing counsel does
misstate the law in this case. There was no circuit split until after 1993
and this Court's decision in Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins.
Additionally, your Honors, Respondents erred in several additional
respects.
There is no business necessity.
There's nothing in
Respondent's profit plan to indicate that this is a temporary measure, that
Respondent has any intention of not discriminating in perpetuity.
Additionally, Respondent can't possibly justify this as a business
necessity, this linking salary to years of experience, when they don't
extend the option of allowing any qualified individual to accept the
position at $28,000 per year for the first year in salary. And despite
Respondent's protest to the contrary, the record at page seventeen very
expressly states that Part II of the profit plan has allowed the college to
enjoy the most expansion and the best fiscal health since it opened the
School of Criminal Justice in 1972. There cannot possibly be a business
necessity for these discriminatory hiring practices, and we urge this
Court to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA. Thank you.

[COURT IN RECESS]
CHIEF JUSTICE LEWIS: Please be seated. I would like to
replace some sterner faces with some smiles and just express some of the
feelings of my colleagues and how much they were impressed with the
demeanor, with the argument, with the whole presentation of both teams.
Certainly for me it was a learning experience to be able to
observe how well both teams handled themselves and certainly it was a
very difficult decision on our part to arrive at and I would like to
announce with great pleasure the winner of the 21st Annual Robert F.
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Wagner National Labor Law Moot Court Competition going to Hastings
College of Law. And that team is comprised of Christy Holman and
John Elovson and the outstanding member of that team is Christy
Holman.
But I would also like you to give a big round of applause to the
team from Brooklyn Law School. They both did a magnificent job and
certainly it was a difficult decision. Thank you very much.

[COURTADJOURNED]
MR. PETER WALLIS: There are several awards we would like
to present at this time. The fourth best team in the Wager Competition
is John Marshall Law School. The third best team is Pepperdine
University School of Law. The second best team is Brooklyn Law
School. And the best overall team in the Wagner Competition is the
University of California-Hastings School of Law.
MS. NICHELLE LANGONE: The best preliminary round
oralist award is presented to Tamara Baines from the Georgia State
University School of Law. The best petitioner's brief award is presented
to Wake Forest University School of Law and the best respondent's brief
award is presented to John Marshall Law School. Congratulations to
everyone and thank you for attending the 21 st Annual Robert F. Wagner
Sr. National Labor Law Moot Court Competition.

